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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Fengchu Chang, a fifty-five year old native and citizen of 
China, seeks asylum and withholding of deportation based 
on his fear of persecution for violating China's State 
Security Law. Chang, the chief engineer for a state-owned 
company, led a technical delegation to this country from 
July through September of 1992. During the course of this 
visit, Chang violated Chinese law (1) by not reporting to the 
Chinese authorities the members of his delegation whose 
misconduct (under the rules set by the Chinese 
government) suggested they would remain in the United 
States, (2) by meeting with an FBI agent as arranged by the 
American company hosting the delegation, and (3) by 
electing to stay in the United States and to seek asylum 
after being told by the FBI that he was in "danger." Based 
on these violations of Chinese law, Chang fears reprisal if 
he returns to China. The Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied 
his application for asylum and for withholding of 
deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") 
dismissed his appeal, reasoning that because Chang faces 
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prosecution only under a law of "general applicability," he 
does not fear "persecution" based on his political opinion. 




Before leaving China in July of 1992, Chang worked 
simultaneously as the chief engineer of a major state-owned 
company with more than 3000 employees, as director of a 
state Research Institute with more than 100 employees, 
and as senior consultant to the Ministry of Machinery and 
Electronics. In the course of his professional duties, Chang 
had access to confidential technical information about state 
projects. 
 
Chang had traveled outside of China on several previous 
occasions, always in connection with the technical positions 
he held in China. For the 1992 visit to this country, Chang 
was selected as head of the delegation. In this capacity he 
was briefed by a special security agent and instructed to 
monitor the behavior of the other delegates and to report 
any suspicious activity to the Chinese Embassy. The 1992 
delegation of eight people, including Chang, visited the 
United States in connection with a purchase of technology 
by Chang's company from an American company, Pangborn 
Corporation. 
 
After the arrival of the delegation in the United States on 
July 27, 1992, Chang became suspicious that several 
members of the delegation were considering remaining in 
the United States. At the beginning of August, Chang 
overheard a telephone conversation in which one delegate 
discussed the possibility of remaining in the United States. 
Chang observed the same person making another phone 
call about three weeks later. During the second week of 
September, Chang learned from officials at Pangborn that 
another delegate had met with them and intended to stay 
in the United States. Chang also became suspicious of a 
third delegate who had contacts in the United States and 
said that she was checking the procedures for studying in 
the United States in the future. 
 
As head of the delegation, Chang was required to report 
his suspicions to the Chinese Embassy. Not certain that the 
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delegates actually planned to remain in the United States 
and fearful of the consequences that they would suffer at 
the hands of the Chinese government if he did report them, 
Chang did not report either their conduct or his suspicions 
to the Embassy. Another member of the delegation, who 
also suspected that one or more delegates might stay in the 
United States, told Chang to call the Chinese Embassy. He 
also told Chang that he would report Chang to the Chinese 
government upon return to China because Chang had not 
complied with the orders of the Chinese government. 
 
Chang nonetheless still intended to return to China in 
the middle of September, even after becoming suspicious 
that other delegates might stay in the United States and 
despite his concern that their staying and the other 
delegate's report to the government would create risks for 
him upon return to China. On about the 17th of 
September, Chang explained his situation to an engineer at 
Pangborn, in a conversation initiated by the engineer who 
had noted that Chang was distraught. Chang told the 
American that if some of the delegates remained in the 
United States, he (Chang) would face problems upon return 
to China. 
 
Pangborn officials suggested, and arranged for, Chang to 
meet with Barry O'Neill, a person who Chang understood to 
work in the Hagerstown Government. Only later did Chang 
learn that O'Neill worked for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. Chang explained his concerns about his 
safety upon return to China. O'Neill questioned Chang 
about his work and his family and asked if he had access 
to state secrets. 
 
On September 23, 1992, at O'Neill's suggestion, Chang 
met with O'Neill a second time at the Pangborn offices. 
O'Neill reported to Chang that "everything is true," that 
Chang was "in danger," that the only thing Chang could do 
was seek political asylum, and that a special agency in 
Hong Kong would assist Chang's family in leaving China. 
Later that day, again at the suggestion of O'Neill, Chang 
and O'Neill met with an immigration officer in Baltimore. 
Based on that meeting and on what O'Neill had told him, 
Chang applied for political asylum. On September 27, the 
delegation returned to China without Chang. Unknown to 
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Chang at that time, one other member also did not return 
with the delegation to China. 
 
The INS denied Chang's request for asylum and on July 
26, 1994, charged Chang with overstaying his visa, which 
had expired in September 1992. Chang conceded 
deportability but requested political asylum and 
withholding of deportation. At a hearing before the 
Immigration Judge on June 5, 1995, Chang testified that 
he fears persecution if he is returned to China based on his 
access to Chinese state secrets, on his prominent position 
in China, on his contact with the FBI, on his decision not 
to return to China and to seek asylum in the United States, 
and on his failure to report the misconduct of other 
delegates. If he is returned to China, Chang fears that he 
will lose his job, that he will be imprisoned, and that his 
family will suffer retaliation. Since leaving China, Chang 
has spoken with his wife and sister and has learned that 
his wife has been forced to retire and has been questioned 
by security agents, that the local security agency has 
revoked his passport, that his defection has been treated as 
a foreign affairs incident, and that his photo is on record at 
the Ministry of State Security. His sister, who holds a high 
position in their hometown, advised Chang not to return to 
China because the local security agency is "waiting for 
you." 
 
The Immigration Judge denied Chang's petition in a 
somewhat delphic oral opinion. The Judge reasoned that 
prosecution "is not persecution unless that prosecution is 
severe or somehow politically motivated," and that if "the 
punishment is severe for prosecution of a crime, one must 
look to see if that punishment was imposed because of 
some political motive." The Judge concluded that Chang did 
not face persecution "for any political opinion" and that 
instead Chang had only shown "a self-created, subjective 
fear of returning now of either losing his job or being 
prosecuted for a failure in his responsibility." 
 
Chang appealed to the BIA, which dismissed Chang's 
appeal on January 5, 1996. The BIA opinion reviews the 
facts of the case and concludes that: 
 
For the reasons set forth in the Immigration Judge's 
decision, we find that the respondent has not 
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established that a reasonable person in his 
circumstances would fear persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, social group or political 
opinion. See Elias-Zacharias v. INS, 502 U.S. 478 
(1992). In particular, we note that the respondent fears 
prosecution in China because he failed to report his 
colleagues' suspicious activities and because he sought 
asylum in the United States. The prosecution he fears 
is similar to what he believes his colleagues would have 
been subject to had he reported to the Chinese 
Embassy. However, prosecution for the violation of a 
law of general applicability is not persecution, unless 
the punishment is imposed for invidious reason. Matter 
of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), modified on 
other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, supra, Matter of 
Nagy, 11 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 1966). In that it appears 
from the testimony and evidence presented that 
China's security laws are generally applied, there is no 
indication that any action against the respondent 
would be imposed for invidious reasons. We conclude 
that the prosecution the respondent fears should he 
return to China does not constitute persecution as 
contemplated by sections 208(a) and 243(h) of the Act. 
 
The BIA ordered Chang to depart from the United States 
voluntarily by March 1, 1996, subject to extension by the 
district director, or to face deportation. 
 
Chang petitioned this Court for review of the BIA's 
January 5, 1996, order. We have jurisdiction over Chang's 
petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), which has been 
repealed but still applies to this case because the order of 
deportation was entered before September 30, 1996. Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 §§ 306(c)(1), 309, and 604 (c), Pub L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009 (1996), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1105a, 




1. For this reason we refer to the Immigration and Nationality Act as it 
existed prior to amendment by the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
("INA") provides that the Attorney General may, in her 
discretion, grant asylum to an alien who qualifies as a 
"refugee" within the meaning of Section 1101(a)(42)(A) of 
the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992). The 
term refugee includes those who are unable or unwilling to 
return to their country of nationality "because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(42)(A). The INA also provides, in Section 243(h)(1), 
that the Attorney General must withhold deportation to a 
country if the alien's "life or freedom would be threatened 
in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). In order to be eligible for a 
discretionary grant of asylum under Section 208(a), an 
alien need only show a "well-founded fear of persecution," 
but on the other hand, in order to establish entitlement to 
withholding of deportation under Section 243(h)(1), an alien 
must show "a clear probability" of a threat to life or 
freedom. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 (1987); 
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Chang's petition requires us to decide whether the term 
"persecution" under the INA includes the prosecution that 
Chang purportedly faces upon return to China and, if so, 
whether that persecution is "on account of" Chang's 
political opinion. We must also review whether Chang has 
demonstrated a "clear probability" of a threat to life or 
freedom so as to qualify for withholding of deportation and, 
in addition, whether he has established a "well-founded" 
fear of persecution so as qualify for a discretionary grant of 
asylum by the Attorney General. 
 
Our review of the BIA's decision is narrow. As to the 
BIA's construction of the INA, if Congress has evidenced 
"clear and unambiguous intent concerning the precise 
question" before us, then we give effect to that intent. 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Counsel, 
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 
200 (3d Cir. 1996). If the statute is silent or ambiguous, we 
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defer to the agency's interpretation if it is "based on a 
permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 843; Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d at 1239. Under this standard, 
we will not substitute our own judgment for that of the BIA, 
but we must also reject any interpretation by the BIA that 
is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. On questions of fact, we 
will reverse the BIA's determination that Chang is not 
eligible for asylum and not entitled to withholding of 
deportation only if a reasonable fact-finder would have to 
conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed. INS 
v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 480 (1992). 
 
A. Punishment Under "Generally Applicable" Laws 
 
We begin by considering whether Chang has failed to 
show that he qualifies for asylum or withholding of 
deportation simply because he fears punishment under 
China's Security Law, which the BIA concluded is 
"generally applicable." Chang fears prosecution under the 
security laws because he did not report the actions of other 
delegates which suggested they would defect, because he 
did not return to China, because he sought asylum in this 
country, and because he spoke with the FBI. The BIA 
reasoned that since the security laws that Chang violated 
were "generally applicable," Chang had not shown that he 
would be prosecuted for an "invidious reason." Therefore, 
the agency concluded, whatever punishment Chang feared 
could not constitute "persecution" within the meaning of 
the statute.2 
 
The statute itself does not define the term persecution. As 
a general matter, however, we have held that fear of 
prosecution for violations of "fairly administered laws" does 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The BIA refers to "persecution as contemplated by Section 208(a) and 
243(h) of the Act." Section 243(h) does not use the term "persecution," 
instead it requires a "clear probability of a threat to life or freedom" on 
account of one of the enumerated factors. We understand the BIA as 
concluding that prosecution under generally applicable laws cannot 
qualify as "persecution" under Section 208(a) or as a "threat to freedom" 
on account of one of enumerated factors under Section 243(h). 
Consistent with the BIA's language, we use the term "persecution" to 
refer to the standard under both Sections 208(a) and 243(h). 
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not itself qualify one as a "refugee" or make one eligible for 
withholding of deportation. Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46 
(3d Cir. 1991); see also Abedini v. INS, 971 F.2d 188, 191 
(9th Cir. 1992); In Matter of Acosta 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 
(BIA 1985). The refusal to equate fugitive status with 
eligibility for asylum prevents the United States from 
becoming a haven for "common criminals." See Kovac v. 
INS, 407 F.2d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1969). Thus those who 
violate laws governing fraudulent passports, military 
conscription, the distribution of certain films and videos, 
and population control do not merit asylum based on their 
fear of punishment for the crime that they committed. 
Janusiak, 947 F.2d at 48 (rejecting claim of persecution 
based on prosecution for bribing passport officials); M.A. v. 
INS, 899 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting claim that 
penalties for evading laws of conscription constitute 
persecution); Abedini, 971 F.2d at 191 (holding that 
punishment for avoiding military conscription, use of false 
passport, or distributing Western films was not 
persecution); Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(violating population control laws and fear of possible 
punishment under those laws does not constitute 
persecution). 
 
Nothing in the statute or legislative history suggests, 
however, that fear of prosecution under laws of general 
applicability may never provide the basis for asylum or 
withholding of deportation. To the contrary, the statute 
provides protection for those who fear persecution or 
threats to life and freedom "on account of" a number of 
factors, including religion and political opinion, without 
distinguishing between persecution disguised as "under 
law" and persecution not so disguised. As the Second 
Circuit cautioned, in a case concerning illegal departure 
from Yugoslavia, "the memory of Hitler's atrocities and of 
the legal system he corrupted to serve his purposes ... are 
still too fresh for us to suppose that physical persecution 
may not bear the nihil obstet. of a `recognized judicial 
system.' " Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21, 27 (2d Cir. 
1963). The language of the statute makes no exceptions for 
"generally applied" laws; if the law itself is based on one of 
the enumerated factors and if the punishment under that 
law is sufficiently extreme to constitute persecution, the law 
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may provide the basis for asylum or withholding of 
deportation even if the law is "generally" applicable. 
 
This reading of the statute, unlike the BIA's, is both 
faithful to the language of the statute and consistent with 
its legislative history. In the 1980 Refugee Act, Congress 
amended the INA to include Section 208(a), providing for 
discretionary grants of asylum to those who qualify as 
refugees. The Act also amended Section 243(h), making 
withholding of deportation mandatory if the alien 
demonstrates a clear probability of harm on account of one 
of the enumerated factors. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 429 (1987). One of Congress's "primary purposes" 
in enacting the 1980 law was to harmonize United States 
law with the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees ("U.N. Protocol"), to which the United States 
became a party in 1968. U.N. Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 
No. 6577. Congress specifically sought to define "refugee" in 
accordance with the Protocol; the definition of refugee 
under the 1980 Act is thus almost identical to the 
definition in the Protocol. Id. at Art. 2; See Cardoza- 
Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1215- 1216 (reviewing legislative 
history). In interpreting the Protocol, and especially the 
definition of "refugee," the courts have been guided by the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status ("Handbook"), which lacks the 
"force of law" but nonetheless provides significant guidance 
in construing the Protocol. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 
439 n.22; Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 204 (3d Cir. 
1996); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1027 (2d Cir. 1994). 
The Handbook unequivocally provides that persecution is 
not the same as "punishment for a common law offense," 
Handbook ¶ 56, but it is equally clear that prosecution 
under some laws - such as those that do not conform with 
accepted human rights standards - can constitute 
persecution. Id. at ¶ 59. 
 
Moreover, prosecution under the type of law at issue 
here, one which restricts its citizen's entry into, or stay in, 
other countries, has long been recognized by the BIA, by 
the courts, and by the Handbook, as providing a possible 
basis for a claim of persecution. As the Handbook sets out: 
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The legislation of certain States imposes severe 
penalties on nationals who depart from the country in 
an unlawful manner or remain abroad without 
authorization. Where there is reason to believe that a 
person, due to his illegal departure or unauthorized 
stay abroad is liable to such severe penalties his 
recognition as a refugee will be justified if it can be 
shown that his motives for leaving or remaining outside 
the country are related to the reasons enumerated in 
Article I A(2) of the 1951 Convention. 
 
Handbook at ¶ 61. Thus, according to the Handbook, if 
the asylum-seeker's motives in leaving his or her country 
were "related" to "political opinion," and the applicant faces 
"severe penalties" under the laws of the state, prosecution 
under those laws can constitute persecution. In Matter of 
Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (BIA 1968); Rodriquez- 
Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 427 (9th Cir. 1996); Sovich v. 
Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963); Coriolan v. INS, 559 
F.2d 993, 1000 (5th Cir. 1977)3. 
 
Similarly, the Handbook provides that 
 
 In determining whether a political offender can be 
considered a refugee, regard should also be had to the 
following elements: personality of the applicant, his 
political opinion, the motive behind the act, the nature 
of the act committed, the nature of the prosecution, 
and its motives; finally, also the nature of the law on 
which the prosecution is based. These elements may go 
to show that the person concerned has a fear of 
persecution and not merely a fear of prosecution and 




3. Matter of Janus and Janek involved brothers who claimed asylum 
based on their fear of punishment under Hungarian law for overstaying 
their visits in the United States and for seeking asylum. The BIA 
reasoned that "[i]t cannot be said, across the board, that every statute 
imposing criminal sanctions for unauthorized travel outside of a 
particular country must be devoid of political implications." The BIA 
concluded that the brothers faced not "punishment for violation of an 
ordinary criminal statute" but instead "persecution for the political 
offenses" committed against Hungary. 12 I. & N. Dec. at 875. 
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Handbook ¶ 86. Again, it is simply not enough to conclude, 
as the BIA did in this case, that a law applies "generally" 
and therefore prosecution under that law cannot support a 
claim for asylum or withholding of deportation. Rodriquez- 
Roman, 98 F.3d 416; Fisher v. INS, 37 F.3d 1371, 1382 
(9th Cir. 1994); see also Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129 
(7th Cir. 1992). Based on the language and legislative 
history of the statute, we are constrained to reject the BIA's 
interpretation of the term persecution because it is not 
based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 
B. Persecution "on Account of Political Opinion" 
 
We now consider whether the persecution that Chang 
claims he faces is "on account of political opinion" and 
therefore comes within the purview of the INA. We have 
rejected the BIA's conclusion, and the INS's argument, that 
the general applicability of China's law, without more, 
answers this question. The INS also argues, however, that 
under INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), Chang 
has not shown that China's punishment of him would be 
"on account of" his political opinion because China may be 
motivated by factors other than Chang's political opinion in 
electing to prosecute him. After our review of the conduct 
that the China seeks to compel, of Chang's reasons for 
violating the rules, and of the nature of the rules in 
question, we hold that the evidence compels the conclusion 
that China's motives in enforcing its rules against Chang 
are based on Chang's political opinion. 
 
Contrary to the IJ's reasoning in this case, the evidence 
permits no other conclusion than that Chang's violation of 
the Security Law was motivated by his "political opinion." 
In the words of the BIA, Chang "chose not to report the 
possibility [that some of his colleagues would not return to 
China] because he feared that the suspected delegates 
would have been returned to China, fired from employment, 
and imprisoned regardless of whether they had intended to 
remain in the United States." Chang defied the Chinese 
government's orders because he disagreed with the 
government's treatment of those who might defect.4 He took 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The dissent finds that Chang's own testimony belies such a 
conclusion. See p. 26. But at the hearing Chang was asked why he did 
 
                                12 
a personal risk to defy the government because of the 
manner in which that government would punish the other 
delegates. To characterize this action and Chang's 
motivation in taking it as anything other than political 
narrows the term "political" beyond recognition.5 Unlike 
those, for example, who violate population control laws 
because they want more children, see Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 
801, 805 (9th Cir. 1996), or those who violate exit control 
laws in search of economic opportunity, see Si v. Slattery, 
864 F. Supp. 397, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), Chang failed to 
report his fellow delegates based solely on his disagreement 
with the punishment that they were likely to face at the 
hands of the Chinese government. This action came not 
because of, but in spite of, his concerns for his family and 
his fear of retaliation. 
 
The IJ reasoned that Chang 
 
did make a choice not to return to China and [ ] it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
not call the Chinese Embassy and report his colleagues. Chang 
responded that he was "familiar with China's conditions. This things has 
a bearing of the person's life, future," and that upon return to China the 
individuals who broke the rules "will be put in a special check room -- 
check room, a block house security agency, a military, and then to make 
clear -- to make sure what happened. Anyhow, they will lose their job 
and lose job, keep them (indiscernible) until the security agency they 
made (indiscernible)." (A.R. 122-123). Chang in effect is stating that he 
did not report his colleagues because of the punishment that they would 
face in China. (This is also exactly what the BIA found. (A.R. at 3)). On 
the basis of such testimony, we find it reasonable to conclude that 
Chang was defying the orders of the Chinese government because he 
disagreed with the government policy behind them. We do not find it 
necessary for Chang to use the word "political" in order to satisfy the test 
set forth in Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
5. See, e.g., the definition of"political" in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 
(1979): 
 
Pertaining or relating to the policy or the administration of 
government, state or national. Pertaining to, or incidental to, the exercise 
of the functions vested in those charged with the conduct of government; 
relating to the management of affairs of state, as political theories; of or 
pertaining to exercise of rights and privileges or the influence by which 
individuals of a state seek to determine or control its public policy...." 
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could be believed or perceived by many that his choice 
of not returning to China was somehow motivated on 
the principle that he opposes in some way to the 
Chinese government. The respondent, however, has not 
manifested such opposition. He has manifested in his 
application his support and sympathy for incidents 
such as the Tianamen Square incident in 1989 and his 
reluctance to restrict individuals when they are abroad 
conducting their profession. Yet, that is not the test 
that the Court must apply in determining whether or 
not such manifestations are such that they warrant 
political asylum. 
 
To the contrary, the evidence compels a reasonable fact 
finder to conclude that Chang has "manifested" opposition 
to the Chinese government. His actions in defying the 
orders of the Chinese government because he disagreed 
with how they would treat those suspected of trying to 
defect did exactly that. Simply because he did not call 
himself a dissident or couch his resistance in terms of a 
particular ideology renders his opposition no less political. 
See Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1029 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(reasoning that resistance is no less political simply 
because alien did not state that he belonged to a political 
party, or which political philosophy he supported). 
 
We must, of course, look beyond Chang's motives to 
those of China. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), 
requires that China's enforcement of its Security Law be 
"on account of " Chang's political opinion in order for 
Chang to qualify for relief. Indeed, an applicant for asylum 
must show not that the persecutor's motives for 
persecuting the applicant are "political" in some general 
sense but instead that the persecutor is motivated 
specifically by the political opinions of the asylum-seeker. 
Thus the Court held in Elias-Zacharias that persecution for 
failing to join a guerilla movement was not, on its face, "on 
account of " the applicant's political opinion. Instead the 
guerillas sought to fill their ranks and retaliated against 
those who refused to fight based on their refusal to fight, 
not based on their political opinion. 
 
The Immigration Judge in this case made no adequate 
finding as to the Chinese government's motives in enforcing 
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the security laws against Chang, although the opinion 
concludes that Chang did not fear persecution on account 
of one of the enumerated grounds. The BIA based its 
reasoning that Chang's persecution was not on account of 
political opinion because the law, under which he would be 
prosecuted, applies generally. This is a conclusion, 
however, that we have already rejected. 
 
In addition to ignoring the U.N. Handbook and relevant 
cases, the BIA and Immigration Judge also failed to 
consider the nature of the statute being enforced and the 
actions that China sought to compel by that statute, both 
of which help determine the motives of the alleged 
persecutor. For example, enforcement of a statute aimed at 
the expressive conduct of political dissidents would 
constitute persecution based on "political opinion," but the 
enforcement of rules governing conscription does not 
necessarily constitute persecution. This distinction is 
necessary to effectuate the language of the INA - otherwise, 
breaking any "law", no matter how directly that law was 
aimed at political opinion, would permit the state to say 
that it was punishing the conduct of breaking the law, not 
the political opinion that led to that conduct.6 See Perkovic 
v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 622 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
punishment under laws against peaceful political 
expression is "on account of" political opinion); Bastanipour 
v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992) (reaching the 
unassailable conclusion that prosecution under law against 
apostasy is "on account of " religion); Rodriguez-Roman v. 
INS, 98 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that punishment 
for politically-motivated violations of exit laws constitutes 
punishment "on account of" political opinion). 
 
In this context, we conclude that China's enforcement of 
the rules governing Chang's unauthorized stay in this 
country and his refusal to report others who violated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. One could virtually always argue that prosecution under laws 
prohibiting political dissent is not "on account of" political opinion 
because the persecutor is concerned with the action, not the opinion 
that motivates it. (i.e., "we prosecute him because he says things critical 
of the government, but we do not care if he actually holds this opinion."). 
Elias-Zacharias does not require this result. 
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security rules would be "political." The Criminal Code 
provides a one year prison term for those who do nothing 
more than violate its exit control laws. As the Ninth Circuit 
has reasoned: 
 
The Second Circuit stated the proposition 
unequivocally: "It would be naive to suppose ... that 
punishment for illegal departure ... is not politically 
motivated, or does not constitute punishment because 
of ... political opinion." [Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 
(2d Cir. 1963)]. Because the crime is intended to 
punish those who exhibit a grave form of disloyalty to 
their homeland, we simply acknowledge here what 
should by now have been apparent to all: that a state 
which severely punishes unlawful departure views 
persons who illegally leave as disloyal and subversive 
and seeks to punish them accordingly. Thus the motive 
that a petitioner must show on the part of the state is 
initially established on the face of a statute that 
criminalizes illegal departure. 
 
Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d at 430 (internal footnote 
omitted). 
 
The nature of China's Security Law makes clear the 
importance of scrutinizing the statute or rules pursuant to 
which the applicant claims prosecution is likely. According 
to the Human Rights Watch/Asia, July 29, 1994 Report, 
which is part of the administrative record, "the principal 
objective" of the 1993 Regulations for the State Security 
Law "appears to be to frighten dissidents into halting their 
activities." The Report goes on to say that the State Security 
Law may be used to prosecute "all activities actionable 
under the `counterrevolution' clauses of the Criminal Code, 
while avoiding the alarm caused in the international 
community by the overtly political language of the latter." 
To this end the regulations leave "completely vague and 
open to political interpretation" the definition of "harm to 
state security." Although we recognize that the use of 
materials prepared by "watchdog" organization is not 
without its problems, see M.A. v. I.N.S., 899 F.2d 304, 313 
(4th Cir. 1990), this report at least suggests that the INS 
should have carefully examined China's motives in 
enforcing its Security Law. We do not suggest that relief to 
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an alien should be granted based solely on such reports 
particularly where they conflict with findings of the 
Department of State. In this case, however, the Human 
Rights Watch/Asia report is consistent with the State 
Department report that is also part of the administrative 
record and which says, in part, that although in "several 
instances" the Chinese government brought its behavior 
"into conformity with internationally accepted human rights 
norms," that China has not yet "significantly mitigated 
continuing repression of political dissent."7 
 
Moreover, even if we should determine that the law itself 
does not establish the requisite motive, we would 
nonetheless conclude that Chang's unique situation 
compels the realization that the state's motive is, in part, 
political. In selecting Chang to head the delegation, the 
Chinese government entrusted him with politically sensitive 
obligations to limit the freedoms of other delegates by 
preventing them from meeting or talking with other people 
without permission, by restricting their use of the phones, 
and by reporting all suspicious behavior to the Chinese 
Embassy. When Chang, specifically selected by the 
government to preform these sensitive tasks, refused to 
comply because he disagreed with the punishment that the 
government would mete out for violations, China's 
enforcement of the security laws is at least in part"on 
account of " Chang's political opinion. To argue that Chang 
is prosecuted merely for "breaking the law" and not on 
"political" grounds is to turn a blind eye to the motives of 
the government. Those motives are, at least in part, to 
punish those, like Chang, who have manifested opposition 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The United States Department of State released a new CHINA COUNTRY 
REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996 on January30, 1997, which 
documents that in 1996 "[s]ecurity policy and personnel were 
responsible for numerous human rights abuses," and that the Chinese 
government "continued to commit widespread and well-documented 
human rights abuses ... stemming from the authorities' intolerance of 
dissent, [and] fear of unrest...." This report plays no role in our decision, 
however, because it is not part of the record in this case. 
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to the policy of the Chinese government and to prevent 
others from taking similar political actions.8 
 
The INS argues that China may have been motivated by 
legitimate concerns of protecting confidential state 
information. As an initial matter, we note that neither the 
BIA or the IJ mentioned this consideration as a basis for 
their opinions, nor did they make a factual finding or 
indeed, even suggest, that these were China's motives. More 
fundamentally, even if this concern motivated the Chinese 
government in part, we conclude that China was also 
motivated, at least in part, by Chang's opposition to official 
policy. Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(finding that the plain meaning of the phrase"persecution 
on account of the victim's political opinion" does not mean 
persecution solely on account of the victim's political 
opinion). This conclusion is based on the statute itself, 
which provides potentially harsh punishment for mere 
violation of the exit laws, on the responsibilities with which 
Chang was entrusted, on the appearance of disloyalty and 
political opposition as a result of Chang's actions, and on 
Chang's actual motivations in breaking China's laws. See 
Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 874 (1968) 
(considering Janus' standing in the Communist party, his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Our conclusion does not suggest that all Chinese visitors who overstay 
their visas or emigrate without permission are eligible for asylum. 
Chang's fear of persecution upon return is not based simply on his 
departure, it is also based on his refusal - on political grounds - to 
report his colleagues as he was instructed to do. This political 
resistance, not economic concerns, generated his fear and led to his 
overstaying his visa. We leave for another occasion the question under 
what circumstances an applicant, who violates exit laws but who has no 
political motive in so doing - although perhaps the government imputes 
such a motive - may qualify for asylum based on fear of prosecution 
under the exit laws. See Rodriquez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 430 (holding that 
the applicant must flee homeland for political reasons in order to qualify 
for asylum based on violating exit laws.) 
 
Moreover, as the next section discusses, Chang's fear of persecution 
upon return is unique and compelling. Thus those who flee China for 
economic reasons, or because they have violated another statute, may be 
able to prove neither that China's persecution of them would be "on 
account of" their political opinion or that their fear of persecution is 
"well-founded," but in this case we reach neither question. 
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obligation to propagandize for the Czech government, the 
severity of punishment that he faced, and the government's 
concern with defection, and concluding that Janus faced 
not punishment for violating an ordinary criminal statute, 
but persecution for the political offense he has committed 
against the state). 
 
C. The "Well-Founded" Fear of Persecution and the 
"Clear Probability of Persecution" Standards  
 
Chang must demonstrate that his fear of persecution is 
"well-founded" in order to qualify for a discretionary grant 
of asylum under section 208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980. 
He must also show that he faces a clear probability of harm 
to qualify for mandatory withholding of deportation under 
Section 243(h) of the Act. We will reverse on these two 
questions only if a reasonable fact-finder would be forced to 
conclude that Chang has shown the requisite fear of 
persecution. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. at 481. Under the 
"clear probability" of persecution standard of§ 243(h), the 
Attorney General must withhold deportation if Chang 
demonstrates that upon return to China "his life or freedom 
would be threatened" on account of one of the statutory 
factors. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1237. To 
meet this standard, Chang must show with objective 
evidence that it is "more likely than not" he will face 
persecution if he is deported to China. INS v. Cardoza- 
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987). 
 
The test under § 208(a) is less exacting; Chang need only 
show that he has a subjective fear of persecution that is 
supported by objective evidence that persecution is a 
reasonable possibility. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 
430, 440; Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 
(BIA 1987) (holding that "an applicant for asylum has 
established a well-founded fear if he shows that a 
reasonable person in his circumstances would fear 
persecution"). This lesser standard does not require a 
showing that persecution is more likely than not. Fear can 
be well-founded even "when there is a less than 50% 
chance of the occurrence taking place." Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. at 431. If Chang meets this standard, the Attorney 
General may, but is not required to, grant asylum. 
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In evaluating the likelihood that Chang faces persecution 
upon return to China, we begin with a consideration of the 
possible punishment that Chang faces under China's laws. 
China's treatment of those who violate the security laws is 
relevant both as to how likely it is that Chang will be 
punished and as to whether or not such punishment would 
constitute persecution. Only if that punishment is severe 
enough to constitute "extreme conduct," can it constitute 
persecution. See Fatin v. INS 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 
(reasoning that the term persecution does not "encompass 
all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or 
even unlawful or unconstitutional"). Although"generally 
harsh conditions shared by many other persons" do not 
constitute "persecution," id. (quoting In Matter of Acosta, 19 
I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)), the term does include 
threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic 
restrictions so severe that they constitute a real threat to 
life or freedom. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240. To prove his claim, 
Chang must therefore show either that he has a well 
founded fear or that there is a clear probability that he will 
suffer not just harm, but harm that qualifies as 
"persecution" under this standard. 
 
According to Chang's testimony at the hearing before the 
Immigration Judge and in his application for asylum, upon 
return to China, Chang would be arrested, detained in a 
"block house," imprisoned, and lose his job. The INS 
introduced into evidence a United States Department of 
State Report on country conditions in China, which notes 
that Article 176 of the Criminal Code provides a prison 
sentence of up to one year for violating China's exit laws. 
Most economic immigrants, according to the Report, are not 
imprisoned upon return to China, although some repeat 
offenders have received one year "administrative sentences" 
of imprisonment in labor camps. Chang submitted a report, 
authored by Ross Munro of the Foreign Policy Institute, 
which found that because of Chang's access to privileged 
information, his high status in the Chinese government, 
and the position with which the Chinese government 
entrusted him, Chang would face a longer sentence. The 
Department of State Report concluded that political 
dissidents in general do not fare well in China; the Report 
relates that "in 1994 there continued to be widespread and 
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well-documented human rights abuses in China, in 
violation of internationally accepted norms, stemming both 
from the authorities' intolerance of dissent and the 
inadequacy of legal safeguards for freedom of speech, 
association and religion." Such abuses "include arbitrary 
and lengthy incommunicado detention, torture and 
mistreatment of prisoners." AR 0199. 
 
The BIA did not discuss the likelihood that Chang would 
face persecution on return to China, and it is difficult to 
determine exactly what the immigration judge concluded on 
this subject. The immigration judge stated in his oral 
opinion that "as indicated, in country conditions [sic] the 
government of China does not persecute its members 
simply for returning after they have been in another 
country illegally." Leaving aside the problem that Chang 
has done more than remain in this country illegally, the "as 
indicated" does not refer to any previous discussion or 
statement by the judge concerning the country conditions 
of China. The judge stated in the previous paragraph that 
he was not convinced that Chang "would, in fact, be 
punished as that term is defined under the Act as a means 
of persecution for any political opinion." This appears to go 
to the motives of China in exacting punishment, not to 
whether it enforces its security laws, and nowhere does the 
judge state a basis for reaching any conclusion about the 
"country conditions of China."9 Indeed, at the outset of the 
opinion the judge stated that neither the State Department 
report nor the report of Ross Munro provided much "weight 
to its decision." 
 
As discussed, Chang testified that both he and his fellow 
delegates faced potential imprisonment and economic 
repercussions for violations of the security laws, a claim 
that the BIA repeated without comment. The IJ made no 
finding that this testimony lacked credibility. See Sotto v. 
INS, 748 F.2d 832, 837 (3d Cir. 1984) (remanding in part 
because IJ and BIA must articulate reasons for discrediting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The opinion appears to confuse three distinct issues: whether Chang's 
fear of persecution is well-founded, whether what he fears is severe 
enough to constitute "persecution," and whether the punishment that he 
fears would be imposed for one of the statutorily prohibited grounds. 
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evidence before them); Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 341 
(9th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that although the IJ is in the 
best position to make credibility determinations, the IJ 
must offer a specific reason for disbelieving the applicant's 
testimony or the court should accept the testimony as 
true); see also, Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 451 (7th Cir. 
1995) (vacating BIA order that did not "address[ ] in a 
rational manner the questions that the aliens tendered for 
consideration"). Further, the State Department Report, 
introduced by the INA, supports this claim. Chinese law 
provides that violations of exit laws alone can result in a 
year of punishment, and those who express political 
opposition to the Chinese government may face 
imprisonment and torture. It is uncontroverted that Chang 
violated the security laws in several ways, and as the IJ 
acknowledged, Chang's actions "could be believed or 
perceived by many" as being motivated by political 
opposition to the Chinese. 
 
Under these circumstances, punishment of up to one 
year of imprisonment under Article 176, and perhaps 
significantly more, are sufficiently severe to constitute 
"persecution" under this Circuit's standard in Fatin. See 
Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 431 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(concluding that three years in prison for leaving Cuba 
qualifies as persecution); Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. at 875 
(holding a year long sentence enough to constitute 
persecution for leaving Hungary). We simply cannot credit 
the IJ's unexplained conclusion about China's country 
conditions. And even if it is true that China does not 
generally punish those who simply violate its exit laws, that 
conclusion has little to do with this case, where the 
violation of the security laws was far more extensive and 
fraught with political implications. 
 
We now turn to a related inquiry -- the likelihood that 
Chang will experience this persecution if he is returned to 
China. In addition to the information about China's laws in 
general, the evidence in this case is that 1) Chang violated 
China's Security Law by remaining in the United States and 
by failing to report others to the Chinese government; 2) 
one other member of the delegation also failed to return to 
China; 3) China is aware that Chang remained in this 
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country beyond the time that he was permitted to do so 
and may be aware that he seeks asylum; 4) Chang held a 
high-level position in the Chinese government and was 
privy to confidential state technical information; 5) China 
has treated his defection as "foreign affairs incident" and 
posted his photograph at the local security office; 6) the FBI 
told Chang that he was "in danger"; 7) Chang's wife was 
forced to retire early and his son is not allowed to attend 
the university. The IJ noted that the information about the 
incident being treated as a foreign affairs incident was 
provided by Chang's sister, but that she did not submit a 
letter, although "she probably could have done so." We 
defer to this conclusion that the evidence from the sister 
lacked credibility, and we do not consider it further. The IJ 
also noted that Chang gave no confidential information to 
the FBI and that it is not clear that the Chinese 
government is aware that Chang sought political asylum in 
this country or met with the FBI. 
 
It would be virtually impossible for Chang to demonstrate 
what the Chinese government does or does not know about 
his conversations with the FBI or about his application for 
asylum. It is beyond dispute, however, when a high-ranking 
state employee entrusted with supervising an entire 
technical delegation suddenly and inexplicably fails to 
return to China, leaving his important positions with the 
Chinese government and his entire family behind, that the 
Chinese government may suspect that the he applied for 
asylum in this country. Even assuming, however, that 
China does not know or believe that Chang applied for 
asylum, Chang has demonstrated disloyalty to the Chinese 
through his unauthorized stay in this country such that, 
given his position with government and his responsibilities 
in supervising the delegation, it is more likely than not that 
he faces persecution upon return. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we are particularly mindful 
of the responsibilities with which Chang was entrusted by 
China and of the unusual role of FBI in this case. Chang 
did not initiate contact with the FBI. The uncontroverted 
evidence shows that the FBI told Chang that he was in 
"danger." Certainly this constitutes strong objective 
evidence that Chang was, in fact, in danger. The FBI agent 
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went so far as to escort Chang to the meeting with the 
immigration officer. And although we do not know what the 
Chinese government knows of Chang's meetings with the 
FBI, we agree with Chang that, regardless of whether he 
gave information to the FBI, the Chinese government is 
more likely than not to believe that he did. Of course, the 
Chinese government may not know anything of his meeting 
with the FBI. This possibility is one factor in the calculus, 
but we cannot disregard the possibility that China does 




Considering the evidence of China's laws and practices 
and the facts of Chang's case, we are compelled to conclude 
that Chang faces a better than even likelihood that he will 
experience a significant term of imprisonment that 
constitutes persecution if he is returned to China. Chang is 
thus entitled to withholding of deportation under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1253(h). He also meets the less exacting requirements of 
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), and is therefore eligible for a 
discretionary grant of asylum. The order denying witholding 
of deportation and asylum is therefore vacated, and the 
case is remanded for the Attorney General's decision as to 
whether Chang is entitled to a discretionary grant of 
asylum. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The facts of this case, as recounted in the majority's 
opinion, arouse considerable sympathy for petitioner Feng 
Chu Chang. There is, however, no basis for upsetting the 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. 
 
The immigration judge and the BIA found that Chang 
failed to prove that he had a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of political opinion. We are required 
to uphold that decision unless no reasonable factfinder 
could have so found. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 
478, 481 (1992). In Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 
1993), we held that: 
 
In order to prevail on a withholding-of-deportation or 
asylum claim based on political opinion, an alien must 
(1) specify the political opinion on which he or she 
relies, (2) show that he or she holds that opinion, and 
(3) show that he or she would be persecuted or has a 
well-founded fear of persecution based on that opinion. 
 
Id. at 1242. 
 
In this case, Chang argues that if he is returned to China 
he will be prosecuted for violating that country's state 
security law. Even if one assumes that the prosecution that 
Chang fears qualifies as "persecution," and even if one 
assumes that Chang's fear is "well-founded," the 
immigration judge and the BIA had reasonable grounds for 
finding that such prosecution would not be "on account of" 
Chang's "political opinion." See 8 U.S.C. §1101(42)(A). This 
is so for the simple reason that Chang has never specified 
any political opinion that he holds and that is at odds with 
the Chinese government. 
 
The relevant evidence is easily summarized. Chang, who 
had no desire to defect, became suspicious that one or 
more members of his delegation intended to do so, but his 
suspicion was just that; Chang was uncertain of his 
colleagues' true intentions. A.R. 112-13, 115-16, 122. 
Chang was thus forced to choose between fulfilling his duty 
under Chinese law by reporting his suspicions to the 
Chinese Embassy, thus causing possibly undeserved 
problems for his colleagues, and respecting his loyalty to 
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his colleagues by keeping quiet until and unless he became 
sure of their plans. 
 
Chang testified that he decided not to inform on his 
colleagues without better information. A.R. 113, 115-16 
(Chang's testimony that "[he wouldn't] like to do this" before 
he obtained "new evidence" to "make sure" of their 
intentions). This was certainly a humane and 
understandable decision. But, contrary to the majority's 
conclusion, there is no evidence that it was a political 
decision. According to the majority, a reasonable factfinder 
would be compelled to find that "Chang failed to report his 
fellow delegates based solely on his disagreement with the 
punishment that they were likely to face at the hands of the 
Chinese government." Maj. Op. at 13. The majority holds 
that Chang "manifested opposition to the Chinese 
government" by "defying the orders of the Chinese 
government because he disagreed with how they would 
treat those suspected of trying to defect." Maj. Op. at 14. 
These conclusions are belied by Chang's own testimony. 
 
At no time has Chang said that he opposes the Chinese 
law prohibiting defection; at no time has Chang said that 
he opposes the punishment that his colleagues would have 
faced if he had reported them; and at no time has Chang 
said that he opposes the Chinese government's requirement 
that a delegation leader surveill his fellow delegees. Indeed, 
so far as the record reflects, Chang has never articulated 
any political opinion at odds with the Chinese government. 
 
Rather, his testimony makes it clear that his 
unwillingness to report his colleagues was based solely on 
his uncertainty regarding their true intentions. As Chang 
explains in his brief, he 
 
made a conscious choice not to contact the Embassy. 
He reasoned that he did not want to report the 
individual unless he was absolutely sure of his 
intentions. In the event that he chose to report an[ ] 
individual to the government, that individual would 
suffer severe repercussions. He did not want to cause 
any problems for individuals who may be otherwise 
innocent. 
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Petitioner's Br. at 7 (emphasis added). See also A.R. 12 
(same; Chang's brief before the BIA); A.R. 115-17 (Chang's 
testimony that "[he wouldn't] like to -- to report them to the 
Chinese embassy" "before [he could] make clear" their true 
intentions); A.R. 122 (Chang's testimony that it was "hard 
. . . to make a decision" because there was "no way to make 
-- make sure" of his colleagues' plans); A.R. 113. 
 
Rather than representing political opposition to China's 
state security law, Chang's conduct simply reflects a 
concern for accuracy in its enforcement. See Chang Br. at 
31 (Chang's conduct was intended "to avoid false 
accusations of an otherwise innocent individual"). Such a 
concern is honorable, but I fail to see how it compels the 
factual conclusion that Chang "defied" the Chinese 
government because he held a political opinion contrary to 
the state security law.10 Accordingly, I dissent. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The majority holds that, for a variety of reasons, the evidence 
compels the conclusion that China's motive in prosecuting Chang for 
violating the state security law is, in part, political. Maj. Op. at 15-16. 
Because of its conclusion that Chang's conduct was based "on political 
grounds," the majority does not need to reach the question whether an 
asylum applicant can show the requisite fear of persecution "on account 
of . . . political opinion" where he in fact has manifested no political 
opinion but his home country's government erroneously imputes to him 
a disfavored political opinion. See Maj. Op. at 17 n.7. I am not aware of 
any case in which an asylum applicant prevailed on a claim of 
"persecution" on account of "political opinion" where he did not hold any 
political opinion at odds with his home country's government and did 
not present any evidence that his home country's government had 
attributed a specific political opinion to him. 
 
In Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1996), the court held 
that in order to show that prosecution for unlawful departure constitutes 
"persecution," the applicant "must prove that he is one of the persons at 
whom the illegal departure statute was directed-- persons who flee their 
homeland for political reasons." Id. at 430 (citations omitted). See also 
id. at 426. The majority endorses the proposition that "if the asylum- 
seeker's motives in leaving his or her country were`related' to `political 
opinion' . . . prosecution under [unlawful departure laws] can constitute 
persecution." Maj. Op. at 11. However, the majority errs in applying it to 
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this case, because, as I have explained in the text, there is no evidence 
that Chang's conduct was based on any political opinion. 
 
Moreover, courts accepting the "imputed opinion" theory have not 
merely presumed that a foreign government has attributed a political 
opinion to the applicant; rather, they have required that the applicant 
actually "produce[ ] evidence of such a mistaken imputation." Chen v. 
INS, 95 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1996). See Singh v. Ilchert, 69 F.3d 375, 
379 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on evidence that "the police imputed to 
Singh the beliefs of the Sikh separatists and harmed him on that basis"); 
Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on evidence 
that the applicant was tortured because he was suspected of being a 
Sikh separatist); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(relying on evidence that the Ton Ton Macoutes "attributed subversive 
views" to Desir). Under Elias-Zacarias the fact that the Chinese 
government may have a political motive in prosecuting Chang does not 
show that the prosecution would be "on account of " Chang's "political 
opinion." See 502 U.S. at 482. And Chang did not present evidence 
sufficient to compel the conclusion that the Chinese government has 
imputed a political opinion to him. See id. ("Nor is there any indication 
(assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that the guerrillas erroneously 
believed that Elias-Zacarias' refusal was politically based"). 
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